By ROSS DOUTHAT
The murmurs about Barack
Obama being forced out began in Berlin and Beijing. After his party lost the
midterm vote, there were hints that a government of technocrats would be
imposed on America, to save the country from a debt crisis and the world from a
depression.
As the debt-ceiling negotiations stalled
out over the summer, a global coalition — led by Germany, China and the
International Monetary Fund — began working behind the scenes to ease Obama out
of the White House. The credit downgrade was the final blow: the president had
lost the confidence of the world’s shadow government, and his administration
could no longer survive.
Within days, thanks to some unusual constitutional
maneuvering, Obama resigned the presidency and Michael Bloomberg was invited to
take the oath of office. With Beijing issuing veiled threats against our
currency, Congress had no choice but to turn the country’s finances over to the
Senate’s bipartisan Gang of 6, which in turn acceded to Chinese and German
“supervision” of their negotiations. Meanwhile, there was a growing consensus
in Europe and Asia that only a true global superstate could prevent the debt
contagion from spreading ...
FOR Americans, the scenario I’ve just imagined is a
paranoid fantasy, the kind of New World Order nightmare that haunts the sleep
of black-helicopter watchers and Trilateral Commission obsessives.
But for the inhabitants of Italy and Greece, who have
just watched democratically elected governments toppled by pressure from
financiers, European Union bureaucrats and foreign heads of state, it evokes
the cold reality of 21st-century politics. Democracy may be nice in theory, but
in a time of crisis it’s the technocrats who really get to call the shots.
National sovereignty is a pretty concept, but the survival of the European
common currency comes first.
There were few tears in Italy and Greece for Silvio
Berlusconi and George Papandreou, the prime ministers — respectively corrupt
and hapless — whose downfalls were engineered by the Brussels-Berlin-Paris
axis. But their forced departures, however welcome, open a troubling window on
what a true European state would look like. Stability would be achieved at the
expense of democracy: the rituals of parliaments and elections would endure,
but the real decision-making power would pass permanently to the forces
represented by the so-called “Frankfurt Group”
— an ad hoc inner circle consisting of Germany’s Angela Merkel, France’s
Nicolas Sarkozy and a cluster of bankers and E.U. functionaries, which has been
spearheaded European crisis management since October.
The preview is important because this is precisely the
future that almost every informed commentator assumes Europe needs to embrace
in order to save the euro and prevent an economic meltdown. The old
conventional wisdom held that a continentwide currency union was a wonderful
idea, and that euroskeptics were all knuckle-dragging troglodytes. The new
conventional wisdom is that yes, well, maybe the knuckle-draggers were right
about the perils of the euro, but it’s far too late to back out now.
Or at least it’s too late at the moment. After the
current crisis has passed, some voices have suggested, there will be time to
reverse the ongoing centralization of power and reconsider the E.U.’s
increasingly undemocratic character. Today the Continent needs a unified fiscal
policy and a central bank that’s willing to behave like the Federal Reserve,
Bloomberg View’s Clive Crook has suggested. But
as soon as the euro is stabilized, Europe’s leaders should start “giving
popular sovereignty some voice in other aspects of the E.U. project.”
This seems like wishful thinking. Major political
consolidations are rarely undone swiftly, and they just as often build upon
themselves. The technocratic coups in Greece and Italy have revealed the power
that the E.U.’s leadership can exercise over the internal politics of member
states. If Germany has to effectively backstop the Continent’s debt in order to
save the European project, it’s hard to see why the Frankfurt Group (its German
members, especially) would ever consent to dilute that power.
One could argue that the Greeks and Italians — and the
Spanish and the Irish and everyone else — should have known what they were
signing up for when they joined the euro in the first place. But the fact is
that the project of European union has never enjoyed deep popular support. Its
advocates were always adept at re-running referendums until the vote came out their way, or
designing treaties that bypassed the voting public entirely. The people of Europe have always been wary
of trading their sovereignty for ever-greater unity — and now we can see why.
From the American perspective, a more centralized and
undemocratic Europe is clearly preferable to the risk of another recession. For
the staggering world economy, it would be disastrous if a burst of nationalism
somehow broke up Europe’s common currency.
But that’s easy for us to say: it isn’t our
self-government that’s at stake.

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