BY PETER EAVIS
European leaders have approved their latest aid package
for Greece, raising hopes that the worst phase of the sovereign debt crisis is
over and a persistent source of stress on global markets has been removed.
But Greece’s 130 billion euro ($172 billion) bailout
highlights the weaknesses in Europe’s response to the crisis, some analysts
say. The worry is that these problems could flare up and undermine recovery
efforts in countries like Italy, Spain, Ireland and Portugal.
“I don’t want to be a Cassandra, but the idea that it’s
over is an illusion,” said Kenneth S. Rogoff, a professor of economics at
Harvard University and co-author of “This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of
Financial Folly.” “I am amazed by the short-term psychology in the market.”
Throughout the crisis, the European Union’s favored
strategy has been to provide tightly controlled financial support to highly
indebted countries, in the hope of buying them enough time to implement
policies aimed at cutting budget deficits. While such moves can deepen
recessions, the goal is to eventually lower debt levels and win back the
confidence of the bond markets.
On the margins, investors are becoming more optimistic.
The Continent’s stocks and government bonds have rallied sharply this year on
the belief that Greece would avoid a disorderly exit from the euro.
But Greece’s fate has exposed the severe limitations of
Europe’s approach to the crisis.
Austerity policies contributed to an estimated 6.8
percent drop in the country’s gross domestic product last year. In 2010, the
International Monetary Fund had forecast that Greece’s economy would only
shrink 2.6 percent in 2011.
Greece is also resorting to a move that European
officials initially wanted to avoid at all costs. The country is going to
reduce its overall debt load by requiring some creditors to take losses on
Greek bonds. In total, the restructuring will mean private sector holders of
Greek bonds take a hit of more than 70 percent. Though this amounts to a
default, European officials hope the managed nature of the debt restructuring
will prevent the move from destabilizing markets.
European officials want to avoid undertaking similar
measures for other countries. Last year, after European officials suggested
debt restructurings might be used beyond Greece, the region’s government bonds
sold off. The market reaction prompted officials to remove write-downs from the
crisis management toolbox — at least for now.
To avoid such a situation, European officials have
introduced a range of measures over the last year that may buy more time for
struggling countries.
The European Union is setting up large pools of money to
make emergency loans. The region’s leaders have agreed to move toward more
coordinated fiscal policies, which may pave the way for richer countries to
transfer funds to poorer ones. And in December, the European Central Bank lent
$620 billion to the region’s banks, preventing a bank run in Europe and helping
firms finance continued purchases of government bonds. Spain’s government has
already sold more than 30 percent of the $114 billion worth of bonds it was
hoping to issue this year.
But one of the lessons of the post-crisis period in the
United States is that monetary stimulus may only temporarily lift the markets
and can take a long time to seep into the real economy. Some economists believe
that, although the European Central Bank has stepped up its response to the
crisis, its policies are not yet as accommodative as those of the United States
Federal Reserve.
For instance, the Fed, in its most forceful stimulus
measure, spent hundreds of billions of dollars buying bonds, supplying banks
with immense amounts of cash that they were free to use as they wished. The
E.C.B. did something different with its $620 billion of loans in December.
Banks had to post collateral against the money they borrowed. While the banks
get cash, they still have to pay back the central bank loans in the future, and
they remain exposed to the assets they posted as collateral. As a result, the E.C.B.
facility may have less effect than the Fed’s bond buying, said Guy Mandy, a
strategist at Nomura International.
Even in the United States, monetary stimulus did little
to repair the balance sheets of the most debt-laden sectors of the economy.
That means European government debt levels may take a lot longer to fall than
officials hope. Certain governments may then require even more aid because they
will not be able to sell bonds into private markets at affordable interest
rates.
As with Greece, aid-disbursing countries like Germany
might demand even tougher conditions on loans. But doing this can set up
potential flashpoints that threaten to destabilize domestic politics and
markets. “This creates a rolling crisis,” said Silvio Peruzzo, an economist at
the Royal Bank of Scotland.
Raoul Ruparel, head of economic research at Open Europe,
a policy group that is sometimes skeptical of the need for closer European
integration, said, “The approach failed monumentally in Greece.”
For a while, the European Union may decide to keep giving
aid to countries that do not meet targets, but this could create wider
political conflicts in Europe. “It could drive a wedge between north and south
in political terms in Europe,” Mr. Ruparel said.
If troubled countries find they cannot comply with the
loan conditions — and their richer neighbors grow increasingly impatient — they
may have to follow Greece’s lead.
The idea with Greece was that private investors, not just
governments, needed to foot some of cost of the country’s aid package, so they
were pressured to accept losses on Greek government bonds. If another country
finds it very difficult to comply with European Union and I.M.F. targets,
“Germany and other countries will support the idea that the private sector has
to pay its fair share of the debt relief,” Mr. Peruzzo said.
Darren K. Williams, an analyst at AllianceBernstein,
said: “I think that would be a huge error that could cause all sorts of other
problems. It’d make Greece a template.”
The big risk is that investors, fearing debt write-downs
in many countries, would dump European government bonds, triggering new
financial and economic weakness in Europe.
But some investors see few options for countries like
Italy, whose debt is at 120 percent of G.D.P., and whose government bond market
is among the largest in the world.
“Italy is essentially in a sovereign debt trap,” said
Richard Batty, global investment strategist at Standard Life Investments.
For Italy’s debt to be sustainable, the country’s economy
either needs to grow at a nominal rate of 5 percent a year, or the interest
rate on its 10-year bond needs to be at 3.6 percent, Mr. Batty estimates.
During Europe’s most recent boom period, from 2002 to 2007, Italy’s nominal
G.D.P. grew at an average rate of 3.6 percent, Mr. Batty said. Meanwhile, its
10-year bond, even after a big rally this year, has a yield of 5.43 percent.
“I don’t think we’re anywhere near the endgame,”
Professor Rogoff of Harvard said

Δεν υπάρχουν σχόλια:
Δημοσίευση σχολίου