CAMBRIDGE – This year is likely to mark a make-or-break ordeal for the
euro. The eurozone’s survival demands a credible solution to its long-running
sovereign-debt crisis, which in turn requires addressing the two macroeconomic
imbalances – external and fiscal – which are at the heart of that crisis. The crisis has exposed the deep disparities in competitiveness that have
developed within the eurozone. From 1996 to 2010, unit labor costs in Germany
increased by just 8%, and by 13% in France. Compare that to 24% in Portugal,
35% in Spain, 37% in Italy, and a whopping 59% in Greece. The result has been
large trade imbalances between eurozone countries, a problem compounded by
large fiscal deficits and high levels of public debt in southern Europe (and
France) – much of it owed to foreign creditors.
Does addressing these imbalances require breaking up the eurozone? Suppose,
for example, that Portugal were to leave and re-introduce the escudo. The
ensuing exchange-rate devaluation would immediately lower the price of
Portugal’s exports, raise its import prices, stimulate the economy, and bring
about much-needed growth. But a euro exit would be a messy affair. The
resulting turmoil could very well trump any short-term gains in competitiveness
from devaluation.
There is a remarkably simple alternative that
does not require southern Europe’s troubled economies to abandon the euro and
devalue their exchange rates. It involves increasing the value-added tax while
cutting payroll taxes. Our recent research demonstrates
that such a “fiscal devaluation” has very similar effects on the economy in
terms of its impact on GDP, consumption, employment, and inflation.
A currency devaluation works by making imports more costly and exports
cheaper. A VAT/payroll-tax swap would do exactly the same thing. An increase in
VAT raises the price of imported goods, as foreign firms face a higher tax. To
ensure that domestic firms do not have an incentive to raise prices, an
increase in VAT needs to be accompanied by a cut in payroll taxes.
Moreover, since exports are exempt from VAT, the price of domestic exports
will fall. The desired competitiveness effects of exchange-rate devaluation can
thus be had while staying in the euro.
This policy can also help on the fiscal front. As is true of an
exchange-rate devaluation, the positive impact on growth of an increase in
competitiveness can strengthen the fiscal position by raising tax revenues.
Moreover, an important advantage of fiscal devaluations is that they generate
additional revenues in proportion to the country’s trade deficit. For countries
that are suffering from weak competitiveness and, as a consequence, running
trade deficits, this typically means more revenues, especially in the short
run.
Like exchange-rate devaluations, fiscal devaluations create winners and
losers. Both act as a wealth levy: inflation means that bondholders suffer a
real loss in proportion to their wealth and the size of the devaluation. If
taxes on capital are not adjusted, holders of domestic stocks suffer a
comparable loss.
By contrast, many transfers, such as unemployment benefits, health
benefits, and public pensions, are indexed to inflation, and thus maintain
their real value. The same is true of minimum wages. These distributive effects
play an important role in the politics of exchange-rate devaluations, and most
of these effects appear in fiscal devaluations as well.
Fiscal devaluations already have some advocates. Indeed, French President
Nicolas Sarkozy’s government just announced one. And concerns that a fiscal
devaluation will conflict with euro rules can be met by simply pointing out
that Germany’s government carried one out in 2007, though by another name, when
it raised VAT from 16% to 19% and cut employers’ contribution to social
insurance, from 6.5% to 4.2%.
In short, there are simple fiscal alternatives to exchange-rate devaluation
that can address southern Europe’s short-term competitiveness problems. To be
sure, feasible fiscal devaluations would be limited in size. But, together with
debt restructuring, accommodative monetary policy, liquidity support from the
European Central Bank, and much-required structural reforms, they can help to
put these troubled economies on a sound footing without a euro breakup or a
major austerity-induced recession.
Emmanuel Farhi is Professor of Economics at
Harvard University. Gita Gopinath is Professor of Economics at Harvard
University. Oleg Itskhoki is a professor of economics and international affairs
at Princeton University.
Copyright:
Project Syndicate, 2012.
www.project-syndicate.org
www.project-syndicate.org
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