By Kemal
Derviş*
ISTANBUL – When European Central Bank President Mario Draghi
announced in late July that the ECB would “do whatever it takes” to prevent
so-called “re-denomination risk” (the threat that some countries might be
forced to give up the euro and reintroduce their own currencies), Spanish and
Italian sovereign-bond yields fell immediately. Then, in early September, the
ECB’s Council of Governors endorsed Draghi’s vow, further calming markets.
The tide of
crisis, it seemed, had begun to turn, particularly after the German
Constitutional Court upheld the European Stability Mechanism, Europe’s bailout
fund. Despite the ECB’s imposition of conditionality on beneficiaries of its
“potentially unlimited” bond purchases, financial markets across Europe and the
United States staged a major rally.
It seems,
however, that the euphoria was short-lived. Yields on Spanish and Italian
government bonds have been inching up again, and equity investors’ mood is
souring. So, what went wrong?
When I welcomed Mario Draghi’s strong statement in August,
I argued that the ECB’s new “outright monetary transactions” program needed to
be complemented by progress toward a more integrated eurozone, with a fiscal
authority, a banking union, and some form of debt mutualization. The OMT
program’s success, I argued, presupposed a decisive change in the macroeconomic
policy mix throughout the eurozone.
There has
been some progress, albeit slow, toward agreement on the institutional
architecture of a more integrated eurozone. The necessity of a banking union is
now more generally accepted, and there is a move to augment the European budget
with funds that could be deployed with policy or project conditionality, in
addition to ESM resources. (Germany and its northern European allies, however,
insist that this be an alternative to some form of debt mutualization, rather
than a complement to it.)
The ESM,
supported by the ECB, could become a European version of the International
Monetary Fund, and the new funds in the European budget could become, with
support from the European Investment Bank, Europe’s World Bank. All of this
will take time, but there is some movement in the right direction.
Where there
has been virtually no progress at all is in the recalibration of the
macroeconomic policy mix. The prevailing strategy in Europe remains simply to
force internal devaluation on the southern countries, with excessive austerity
aimed at causing severe wage and price deflation. While some internal
devaluation is being achieved, it is producing so much economic and social
dislocation – and, increasingly, political upheaval – that there is no supply
response, despite the accompanying structural reforms.
Indeed, the
deflationary spiral, particularly in Greece and Spain, is causing output to
contract so rapidly that further spending cuts and tax increases are not
reducing budget deficits and public debt relative to GDP. And Europe’s
preferred solution – more austerity – is merely causing fiscal targets to
recede faster. As a result, markets have again started to measure GDP to
include some probability of currency re-denomination, causing debt ratios to
look much worse than those based on the certainty of continued euro membership.
While all of
this is happening in Europe’s south, most of the northern countries are running
current-account surpluses. Germany’s surplus, at $216 billion, is now larger than China’s –
and the world’s largest in absolute terms. Together with the surpluses of
Austria, the Netherlands, and most non-eurozone northern countries – namely,
Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway – northern Europe has run a
current-account surplus of $511 billion over the last 12 months. That is larger
than the Chinese surplus has ever been – and scary because it subtracts net
demand from the rest of Europe and the world economy.
Inflicting
excessive austerity on the southern European countries while limiting their
exports by restricting effective demand in the north is like administering an
overdose to a patient while withholding oxygen. The political and economic
success of southern Europe’s much-needed structural reforms requires the proper
dose and timing of budgetary medicine and buoyant demand in the north.
The northern
countries argue that permitting wage growth and boosting domestic demand would
reduce their competitiveness and trade surplus. But that misses the entire
point: surplus countries must contribute no less than deficit countries to
global and regional rebalancing, because the world economy cannot export to
outer space. This argument was always emphasized when the Chinese surplus was
deemed excessive, but it is virtually ignored when it comes to northern Europe.
If
conservative politicians and economists in Europe’s north continue to insist on
the wrong overall macroeconomic policy mix in Europe, they could yet bring
about the end of the eurozone, and, with it, the end of the European project of
peace and integration as we have known it for decades. This is not to argue
against the need for vigorous structural and competitiveness-enhancing reforms
in the south; it is to give those reforms a chance to succeed.
*Kemal Derviş, a former minister of economy in
Turkey, administrator of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and
vice president of the World Bank, is currently Vice President of the Brookings
Institute
www.project-syndicate.org

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