Joseph Stiglitz
NEW YORK –
Central banks on both sides of the Atlantic took extraordinary monetary-policy
measures in September: the long awaited “QE3” (the third dose of quantitative
easing by the United States Federal Reserve), and the European Central Bank’s
announcement that it will purchase unlimited volumes of troubled eurozone
members’ government bonds. Markets responded euphorically, with stock prices in
the US, for example, reaching post-recession highs.
Others,
especially on the political right, worried that the latest monetary measures
would fuel future inflation and encourage unbridled government spending.
In fact, both
the critics’ fears and the optimists’ euphoria are unwarranted. With so much
underutilized productive capacity today, and with immediate economic prospects
so dismal, the risk of serious inflation is minimal.
Nonetheless,
the Fed and ECB actions sent three messages that should have given the markets
pause. First, they were saying that previous actions have not worked; indeed,
the major central banks deserve much of the blame for the crisis. But their
ability to undo their mistakes is limited.
Second, the
Fed’s announcement that it will keep interest rates at extraordinarily low
levels through mid-2015 implied that it does not expect recovery anytime soon.
That should be a warning for Europe, whose economy is now far weaker than
America’s.
Finally, the
Fed and the ECB were saying that markets will not quickly restore full
employment on their own. A stimulus is needed. That should serve as a rejoinder
to those in Europe and America who are calling for just the opposite – further
austerity.
But the
stimulus that is needed – on both sides of the Atlantic – is a fiscal stimulus.
Monetary policy has proven ineffective, and more of it is unlikely to return
the economy to sustainable growth.
In
traditional economic models, increased liquidity results in more lending,
mostly to investors and sometimes to consumers, thereby increasing demand and
employment. But consider a case like Spain, where so much money has fled the
banking system – and continues to flee as Europe fiddles over the
implementation of a common banking system. Just adding liquidity, while
continuing current austerity policies, will not reignite the Spanish economy.
So, too, in
the US, the smaller banks that largely finance small and medium-size
enterprises have been all but neglected. The federal government – under both
President George W. Bush and Barack Obama – allocated hundreds of billions of
dollars to prop up the mega-banks, while allowing hundreds of these crucially
important smaller lenders to fail.
But lending
would be inhibited even if the banks were healthier. After all, small
enterprises rely on collateral-based lending, and the value of real estate –
the main form of collateral – is still down one-third from its pre-crisis
level. Moreover, given the magnitude of excess capacity in real estate, lower
interest rates will do little to revive real-estate prices, much less inflate
another consumption bubble.
Of course,
marginal effects cannot be ruled out: small changes in long-term interest rates
from QE3 may lead to a little more investment; some of the rich will take
advantage of temporarily higher stock prices to consume more; and a few
homeowners will be able to refinance their mortgages, with lower payments
allowing them to boost consumption as well.
But most of
the wealthy know that temporary measures result only in a fleeting blip in
stock prices – hardly enough to support a consumption splurge. Moreover,
reports suggest that few of the benefits of lower long-term interest rates are
filtering through to homeowners; the major beneficiaries, it seems, are the
banks. Many who want to refinance their mortgages still cannot, because they
are “underwater” (owing more on their mortgages than the underlying property is
worth).
In other
circumstances, the US would benefit from the exchange-rate weakening that
follows from lower interest rates – a kind of beggar-thy-neighbor
competitive devaluation that would come at the expense of America’s trading
partners. But, given lower interest rates in Europe and the global slowdown,
the gains are likely to be small even here.
Some worry
that the fresh liquidity will lead to worse outcomes – for example, a commodity
boom, which would act much like a tax on American and European consumers. Older
people, who were prudent and held their money in government bonds, will see
lower returns – further curtailing their consumption. And low interest rates
will encourage firms that do invest to spend on fixed capital like highly
automated machines, thereby ensuring that, when recovery comes, it will be
relatively jobless. In short, the benefits are at best small.
In Europe,
monetary intervention has greater potential to help – but with a similar
risk of making matters worse. To allay anxiety about government profligacy, the
ECB built conditionality into its bond-purchase program. But if the conditions
operate like austerity measures – imposed without significant accompanying
growth measures – they will be more akin to bloodletting: the patient must
risk death before receiving genuine medicine. Fear of losing economic
sovereignty will make governments reluctant to ask for ECB help, and only if
they ask will there be any real effect.
There is a
further risk for Europe: If the ECB focuses too much on inflation, while the
Fed tries to stimulate the US economy, interest-rate differentials will lead to
a stronger euro (at least relative to what it otherwise would be), undermining
Europe’s competitiveness and growth prospects.
For both
Europe and America, the danger now is that politicians and markets believe that
monetary policy can revive the economy. Unfortunately, its main impact at this
point is to distract attention from measures that would truly stimulate growth,
including an expansionary fiscal policy and financial-sector reforms that boost
lending.
The current
downturn, already a half-decade long, will not end any time soon. That, in a
nutshell, is what the Fed and the ECB are saying. The sooner our leaders
acknowledge it, the better.
www.project-syndicate.org

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