By Andres Velasco
SANTIAGO –
The guardians of austerity in Europe are striking back. Their emerging
narrative goes like this:
When some
economists spoke of panic and confidence crises, they meant their own. Bailout
funds and Eurobonds were an invitation to moral hazard. Throwing money at the
problem turned out to be unnecessary. Europe’s problem was an old-fashioned
one: too much spending. Now that technocrats have replaced populists in the
eurozone’s Mediterranean members, sustained fiscal austerity will get us out of
trouble.
Sounds good,
right? If only it were true.
To see how
misguided this narrative is, imagine Europe today without the big gun of cheap
three-year loans from the European Central Bank to the continent’s commercial
banks. You do not have to be a dyed-in-the wool Keynesian to conjecture that
southern European country risk would remain sky-high, and that talk of default
would still be heard everywhere.
Such massive
central-bank intervention was necessary because a confidence crisis gripped
much of the eurozone, with government bonds and banks on the losing end of a
slow-motion speculative attack.
The relevant
logic is at the core of modern macroeconomics – precisely the kind of thinking
that European leaders have ignored at their peril. A country with a large
public debt (say, more than 50% of GDP) is safe if everyone thinks the debt
will be serviced; the interest rate charged on the debt remains low, and the
country can indeed pay it, following a path of virtuous self-fulfilling
expectations.
But
everything changes if markets come to doubt that the debt will be repaid; then
the interest rate demanded by investors can rise so high that the country
cannot pay. Default follows, owing to a vicious self-fulfilling panic.
If a
country’s bond market is about to move from virtuous to vicious dynamics, there
is only one solution. Fans of firearms refer to it as the big bazooka;
followers of Colin Powell advocate deploying overwhelming force;
pyrophobes call it a firewall; sailors like to tie
themselves to the mast. But, ultimately, it comes down to the same thing:
having enough money at hand that no one can doubt, not even for a second, that
the debt will be repaid.
If European
leaders had deployed a rescue fund endowed with overwhelming financial force in
early 2010, Europe and the world would have been spared two years of agony. In
the end, it was the ECB that stepped into the breach, drowning eurozone banks
with liquidity to make sure that they purchased every government bond that moved
– and then some.
So the
speculative attacks were stopped, at least temporarily (though interest-rate
spreads in Spain and elsewhere have begun to creep up again). That was the
first task. But there remains a second one, and here the guardians of austerity
are getting it wrong again.
With a small
public debt, a country cannot be the victim of a debt run. This is where
Greece, Portugal, Italy, and Belgium differ from Canada, Norway, Singapore, and
Chile. In the past, some European countries spent too much and taxed too
little, and are paying for it today. To prevent a repeat of the last two years,
they must reduce their public debt dramatically.
The question
is how. In Greece, debt forgiveness was the only answer. Some has been
accomplished; more will be necessary down the road.
For the rest
of Europe, massive upfront austerity of the kind advocated by German Chancellor
Angela Merkel – and supported by the prevailing German orthodoxy – will not do
the trick.
Spain is a
case in point. Spending has been cut and taxes raised. A new conservative
government has reaffirmed Spain’s commitment to austerity. Yet deficit targets
continue to be missed. The fiscal gap was a whopping 8.5% of GDP in 2011, and,
after much haggling with Brussels, the target has been reset at 5.3% of GDP for
this year. With output flat or falling, the debt-to-GDP ratio will keep rising.
The key to
the solution lies in St. Augustine’s plea: “Grant me chastity and continence,
but not yet.” A fiscal compact like the one approved recently is useful to
anchor expectations of future adjustment, but only if the new system is
flexible enough to be politically credible.
Up-front
gradualism must be the name of the game. And adjustment must be wedded to a
growth strategy. Revenue will grow consistently only if the tax base – that is,
the economy – grows. And that growth requires higher public investment in
infrastructure and human capital.
The guardians
of orthodoxy are not about to put forward such a growth strategy. Will anyone
else?
*Andres
Velasco
Andrés Velasco was Chile’s finance minister from
2006 to 2010, earning praise for innovative policies that included a measure to
save Chile’s copper windfall in a rainy-day fund

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